We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that under a wide range of conditions the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive in long-term bond markets, making payments and retiring long-term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back such bonds. The only active debt-management margin is the short-term bond market. We show that any attempt to manipulate the existing maturity profile of outstanding long-term bonds generates losses, as bond prices move against the sovereign. Our results hold regardless of the shape of the yield curve. The yield curve captures the average costs of financing at different maturities but is misleading regarding the marginal costs.
Introduction
Short-term debt is often cast as the villain in sovereign debt crises, exposing the fiscal authority to sharp swings in interest rates and raising the vulnerability to a rollover crisis. Nevertheless, when faced with increased spreads, sovereigns tend to lower debt issuances while tilting the composition of new bonds toward shorter maturities. 1 This favoritism towards short-term debt during periods of crisis appears puzzling.
In this paper, we study a model that captures various essential elements of sovereign debt markets: a risk of default that is affected by borrowing decisions, an inability to commit by the sovereign to both repayment as well as the fiscal trajectory, a dynamic choice over debt maturity, and equilibrium bond prices that reflect and constrain these choices. Our model adopts several important features from the sovereign debt literature, enriching them along some dimensions while simplifying along others to isolate the forces having to do with the commitment problems of the borrower.
A primary contribution of the paper is to characterize equilibrium bond prices and examine the sovereign's budget set, exploring how it responds to the maturity structure. A major result is that refraining from both actively issuing or repurchasing long-term bonds maximizes the equilibrium budget set. Strategies that engage with long-term debt are more expensive, despite the fact that actuarially fair investors price all bonds.
In our model, an infinitely-lived sovereign with concave utility borrows by issuing non-contingent bonds of varying maturity in global financial markets. Investors in these markets are risk neutral. The sovereign makes decisions sequentially, with no commitment to its future actions, as in the canonical Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model. Importantly, this includes both its decision to repay or default and its fiscal and debt management decisions. When the sovereign is highly indebted, a risk of default arises. We assume default to be costly, to ensure that positive borrowing is possible. We model these costs as stochastic so that default is not typically predictable and its probability, instead, rises smoothly with indebtedness.
A short term one-period bond is always available, but we also allow for a rich and flexible choice over the maturity of debt, allowing the issuance and management of any number of bonds of different maturity. A competitive equilibrium involves a sequence of price functions for each maturity and a description of the sovereign's behavior. Each period, each bond price is a function of the entire distribution of outstanding bonds (the state variable). The sovereign takes these price functions as given to solve a dynamic optimization problem that determines, in each period, whether to default or repay and, in the latter case, how much to issue of each bond. Bond prices, in turn, are pinned down by investors taking future default probabilities into account.
Any given sequence of price functions induces an optimal response by the sovereign, which can be used to define a new set of price functions, consistent with this behavior. An equilibrium is a fixed point of this mapping. Fortunately, we can circumvent this seemingly intractable, high dimensional, fixed-point problem. In particular, we show that the equilibrium outcome solves a planning problem representing a constrained efficient contract between the sovereign and new lenders, with all inherited 'legacy' debt from previous lenders serviced as long as the sovereign does not default. Crucially, our mechanismdesign formulation determines a path of transfers without reference to any prices; in this sense, it constitutes a 'primal' approach, involving only the allocation. Moreover, the problem admits a tractable dynamic programming formulation, which we exploit.
Our first result is, thus, a welfare theorem of sorts: if a one-period bond is available, then any competitive equilibrium allocation corresponds to a solution to the mechanismdesign problem. 2 Since our representation only requires the presence of a one-period bond, and does not place any additional restrictions on the set of available maturities, it follows that the equilibrium allocation can be achieved by exclusively trading one-period bonds. That is, an equilibrium policy is one where the sovereign services interest payments of existing long-term bonds, pays off any maturing bonds, and all new issuances consist of short-term bonds only.
The above result does not rule out that an alternative strategy involving long-term bonds may also be optimal. Indeed, this occurs when default has zero probability, in which case the sovereign is entirely indifferent to the maturity structure of debt. A second main result shows that the optimum is unique whenever default has non-zero probability. In this sense, the debt maturity choice in our model is entirely determined by considerations having to do with default. We also discuss how the mechanism pinning down this maturity choice works through equilibrium bond prices. As we show, any attempt by the sovereign to change the maturity profile of debt generates losses, as bond prices move against such trades. If the sovereign sells long-term bonds in exchange for short-term bonds, the relative price of long-term bonds falls; if the operation is reversed, the relative price rises. Due to these adverse price reactions, it is optimal to engage only in short-term debt.
What drives these price reactions? The answer lies in the effect of the maturity structure on future default risk. This is not a mechanical effect. Indeed, the maturity profile of debt does not affect default decisions nor prices if one were to hold fixed future government consumption. However, the maturity of debt does affect the chosen fiscal trajectory, which, in turn, affects sovereign default decisions. In particular, short-term bonds issuances incentivize the sovereign to choose a fiscal trajectory that reduces default, to economize on the costs of rolling over debt in the future. In the absence of legacy longterm debt, this explains why a sovereign would engage only in short term borrowing, producing a constrained efficient outcome. Now suppose the sovereign does inherit some legacy long-term debt. Given the virtues of short-term debt exposed above, why is it not optimal to repurchase outstanding long-term debt in exchange for short-term debt? The answer is that doing so creates incentives to reduce future borrowing, which in turn lowers the future default probabilities, raising the relative price of long-term bonds. The sovereign prefers to abstain from this operation since this relative price response makes the short-term debt issuance, which is required for the repurchase, too onerous.
This outcome is clearly not efficient, underscoring the fact that our welfare theorem, useful as it is as a tool for the study of equilibrium, does not establish the overall efficiency for all parties. It solves a constrained efficient problem between the borrower and new lenders, but does not include the legacy creditors. If the sovereign, new lenders and all of its legacy creditors could efficiently bargain and restructure debt, the outcome would be to shorten the maturity of the outstanding debt all the way achieving full efficiency with only one-period bonds. However, this cannot take place in a competitive equilibrium, where individual legacy creditors act as price takers, since these legacy investors would have an incentive to hold out and reap a capital gain.
In summary, our results formalize a rationale for the favoritism of short-term borrowing during times where default is likely. The central insight is that with short-term borrowing the costs of higher default risk, reflected in higher interest rates, are entirely borne by the sovereign. Keeping the sovereign "marked-to-market" creates market discipline. Long-term bonds also embed a default premium at the time of issuance, but from the perspective of later periods this premium is a sunk cost that detaches the sovereign from the market and weakens incentives going forward.
Our results are driven by a dual lack of commitment. If the borrower lacked commitment to repay but could commit to the path of debt issuance, conditional on repayment, then debt maturity would be indeterminate. Likewise, if the borrower lacked commitment to future debt issuances, but could commit to the states in which default versus repayment occur, then, again, the maturity of debt would be immaterial. Thus, our model uncovers an interesting interaction between these two commitment problems.
An implication of our analysis is that the incentive for short-term borrowing is not encoded in the market yield curve. It is sometimes argued in popular accounts that short term borrowing is preferred when the yield curve is steep. In our model, given that all bond prices are actuarially fair, the equilibrium yield curve ends up reflecting the expected evolution of the default probability. However, maturity choice is not directly affected by the shape of this yield curve. Indeed, our results hold for any shape of the yield curve. That is, our model is capable of generating upward or downward sloping yield curves, i.e. default probabilities that rise or fall over time. Recall that the sovereign should not engage in trades of long-term bonds to avoid adverse reactions of bond prices. Thus, our results highlight that that the yield curve reflects average costs at different maturities along the equilibrium path, but does not capture the marginal costs of financing different maturities off the equilibrium path.
Related Literature
Our paper relates to an extensive literature on maturity choice, both in corporate finance and macroeconomics. We review key strands of analysis here, highlighting how our contribution differs from and complements the existing literature. For expositional clarity, many of our modeling choices are designed to isolate our mechanism from other forces already established in the literature. Lucas and Stokey (1983) study optimal fiscal policy with complete markets and discuss at length how maturity choice is a useful tool to provide incentives to a government that lacks commitment to taxes and debt issuance, but cannot default. The government has an incentive to manipulate the risk-free real interest rate, by changing taxes which affects investors' marginal utility, to alter the value of outstanding long-term bonds, something ruled out by our small open economy framework with risk neutral investors. Their main result is that the maturity of debt should be spread out, resembling the issuance of consols. Our model instead emphasizes default risk, something absent from their work. Our main result is also the reverse, providing a force for the exclusive use of short-term debt.
A corporate finance literature initiated by Leland (1994) focuses on the optimal default decision for a fixed and given capital structure, that may or may not be chosen optimally in the initial period. In contrast, our model allows the level and maturity of outstanding debt is a sequential choice. In fact, these dynamics are crucial to our results.
The corporate finance and banking literature frequently builds on the notion that bankruptcy involves partially liquidation of an asset, influencing debt maturity choice in a variety of ways. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) emphasize how short-term debt and the threat of liquidation can discipline a manager. A similar mechanism is at play in Jeanne (2009) in an international context.
The fact that existing bondholders hold a claim on liquidated assets also makes them vulnerable to dilution. This is the focus of another vast literature starting from Fama and Miller (1972) . Dilution implies that the recovery value is lower because it is divided across a larger number of creditors; this effect is present even when the probability of default is constant and unchanged. Sovereign default differs from private bankruptcies in that there is no direct liquidation of assets; to make the distinction even starker we abstract from partial repayment after default. Thus, in our setting there is no dilution in recovery values for a fixed default probability. Instead, our mechanism works through the incentives for further debt issuances, which ultimately impact default decisions. Partial liquidation also endows short-term bonds with implicit seniority. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) show how this may induce a maturity rat-race that results in a collapse of the maturity structure. However, this mechanism is not at play when the liquidation value in bankruptcy is zero, as in our environment.
Maturity choice determines how the available assets span shocks, a feature which arises in closed-economy models with incomplete markets and perfect commitment, such as in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) . These papers show that the maturity structure can be appropriately chosen to exploit changes in the yield curve, providing insurance to the fiscal authority. 3 The international quantitative sovereign debt literature emphasizes instead incentives, lack of commitment and the resulting default risk. Hatchondo and Martinez, 2009 and Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012 show that restricting the government to issue long-term bonds improves the quantitative fit of sovereign debt models, and discuss the government's incentives to dilute existing bond-holders. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) introduces maturity choice into this framework and shows that a calibrated version of the model features shortening maturity as default risk increases. The model combines both a desire to use the maturity structure to hedge fiscal risks, together with the inability of the government to commit to future actions (this latter been the main focus of our analysis). These papers focus on Markov equilibria, just as we do here. Relying instead on trigger strategies, Dovis (2012) generates a shortening of maturity of the stock of debt through the hedging motive alone. In related work, Niepelt (2014) sets up a tractable framework to study maturity choice and highlights that longterm bond prices are relatively elastic, a feature which is also generated in our framework. Cole and Kehoe (2000) highlighted the potential downsides of short-term borrowing in a sovereign debt model, because of self-fulfilling roll-over crises, an aspect that we ignore. Broner et al. (2013) where among the first to focus attention on the general shift to short-term borrowing during crisis in emerging markets. They proposed an explanation that is based on time varying risk premia, something that we rule out by assuming risk neutral lenders. 4 Our analysis complements these papers by providing a transparent and tractable framework for analyzing maturity choice. Independently of parameterizations, we identify the role of the maturity structure in the incentives to borrow, and explain why an active use of long-term bonds shrinks the budget set of the sovereign through changes in bond prices. To achieve this, we consciously construct our model to eliminate the hedging motive, focusing solely on incentives.
The sub-optimality of repurchasing long-term bonds on secondary markets is reminiscent of a result in Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991) . Their analysis turns on a finite amount of resources available to pay bond holders. In such a situation, a bond buyback concentrates the remaining bondholders' claim on this collateral, and so drives up the price of bonds. Indeed, the sovereign would like to dilute existing bond holders by selling additional claims to this fixed recovery amount.
An important feature of our analysis is our focus on outside option shocks. Most of the literature has primarily focused on income shocks as the main source of uninsurable risk. We have made this choice to transparently highlight how the incentives for fiscal policy, and the corresponding budgetary implications, are sensitive to maturity choice along the transition. In particular, maturity choice is not used to hedge risk in our environment. A hedging motive would arise if shocks affected consumption absent default, and if these changes in consumption had a non-zero covariance with bond prices. Our environment abstracts from this hedging motive as shocks do not change equilibrium consumption in periods of no default (that is, consumption conditional on not-defaulting is deterministic). Different maturity bonds in our environment are therefore not useful to hedge the risks we consider. Finally, the desire to hedge is also operative in models of full commitment under incomplete markets, while our results arise exclusively due to limited commitment.
The Environment
Consider a small open economy in discrete time with periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . There is a single, freely tradable, consumption good. The economy receives a deterministic sequence of endowments {y t }, where y t ∈ (0,ȳ). 5
Preferences. The sovereign makes economic decisions on behalf of the small open economy. Preferences over consumption streams are characterized by the following utility function:
where β ∈ (0, 1) and u is a continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function defined over the non-negative reals. We denote u ≡ u(0) and u ≡ lim c→∞ u(c), with u, u ∈ (−∞, +∞)
Financial Markets. The country engages in financial trade with the rest of the world, by issuing bonds of different maturities. The financial market is populated by competitive, risk-neutral investors with discount factor R −1 . We assume βR ≤ 1, a natural restriction given the small open economy assumption. A short-term bond is assumed always available, but we are flexible regarding the assumed availability of long-term bonds. At the beginning of each period, the sovereign inherits a portfolio characterized by a sequence of net liabilities going forward. We denote by b t ∈ R the amount of one-period bonds issued in period t − 1 and due in period t. The portfolio of long-term liabilities is a sequence l t = {l 0 , l 1 , . . . }, where l k ∈ R represents the net amount due k periods ahead (period t + k). When convenient, we drop the t subscript and superscript and let {b, l} denote the current period's inherited liabilities. In what follows, we denote by l k the k-th element of the sequence l, and use l ≥k ≡ {l k , l k+1 , . . . } to denote the tail of the sequence l starting k periods ahead. Note that l 0 represents liabilities that were long-term when issued but are due in the current period; hence, b + l 0 represent total debt due in the current period. We restrict l to lie in the set of bounded sequences, i.e. |l k | ≤ l < ∞ for somel for all k ≥ 0. Let L denote the set of liability sequences that satisfy this boundedness condition.
The government enters a period with liabilities {b, l}. It has the option to default, which we discuss below; otherwise, it issues new one-period bonds b ∈ R and shuffle its long-term liabilities to a new sequence l ∈ Γ(l, t). The mapping Γ : L × N → L characterizes the available set of maturities at time t given l. 6 We do not need to impose any assumptions on this set, except for one natural restriction: it is always feasible to exit the period with the same long-term promises that the government inherited; that is, l ≥1 ∈ Γ(l, t). This notation nests environments which range from an infinite number of maturities that are potentially traded, to cases commonly considered in the quantitative literature in which only a handful of finite maturity bonds or exponentially decaying bonds are available (Hatchondo and Martinez, 2009; Arellano and Ramanarayanan, 2012) .
Default.
At the beginning of each period, the government has the option to default, in which case all lenders receive a payout of zero. A fundamental issue in sovereign debt markets concerns the limited ability of creditors to enforce contracts with a sovereign government. A large literature has identified reputational and legal mechanisms which can sustain debt repayment. These approaches share the general feature that default is determined by the sovereign comparing the value of repayment to the value achieved by default. We let v D t denote the value achieved by default in period t. We model this value directly assuming it follows a stochastic process, with the following properties for t ≥ 1. (ii) v D t is independent across time and independent of liabilities;
(iv) there exists a u min > u such that u min + βV < v D t for all t ≥ 1; and
The continuous distribution assumption in (i) is adopted for expositional convenience. The assumption of independence in (ii) is of more importance and allows us to abstract from the hedging benefit of long-term bonds and focus on incentives. The bounded support restriction in (iii) follows naturally from the notion that v D t represents a discounted value of utility achieved after default. Restriction (iv) ensures that receiving zero consumption triggers default with probability one; a simplifying assumption that serves to ensure an interior consumption allocation. The final restriction (v) ensures that default does not occur if debt is sufficiently low.
Timing and Government Problem. At the beginning of the period, the government observes its realized outside option, v D t . It then decides whether to take this option and default. If it does not default, it issues new bonds and consumes. When trading, the government takes as given an equilibrium price schedule for its portfolio of bonds. As is standard in the sovereign debt literature, we restrict attention to Markov equilibria where prices are a function only of payoff relevant state variables, 7 in this case, the inherited liabilities and the current period t. Let q denote the one-period bond price function and Q the cost of changing the portfolio of future long-term liabilities from l to l . Given inherited liabilities (b, l), the government budget constraint at t is
where b and l denote liabilities brought into to the next period and
where ρ k is the price of a promise to pay one unit in k periods. Note that Q(l, l ≥1 , b, t) = 0, so there is no cost associated with carrying forward the inherited long-term liabilities unchanged. Let V(b, l, t) denote the value of not defaulting in period t given liabilities (b, l). If V(b, l, t) is less than v D t , the government defaults; otherwise it solves:
subject to the budget constraint (BC) and the No-Ponzi condition b ≤B, for some finitē B ≥ R(ȳ +l)/(R − 1). 8 The continuation value incorporates the strategic default decision next period. Denote by B(b, l, t) and L(b, l, t) the optimal policies for one-period bonds and long-term liabilities, respectively. If the constraint set for (3) is empty, i.e. there are no way to repay current liabilities, even with zero consumption, we set V(b, l, t) = V; this ensures that default is triggered at the beginning of this period.
Lenders' Break-Even Condition. Lenders must break even in expectation. To compute prices that are consistent with this condition requires computing default probabilities. If the government enters period t with debt (b, l) and exits with portfolio (b , l ), the breakeven condition for one-period debt is 9
To compute the break even condition for long debt, we start from an initial state (b, l, t), and iterate on the government policy functions forward, obtaining the probability
a version of the expectations hypothesis. Iterating, using equation (4), we have
Equilibrium. We are now ready to define an equilibrium in the usual way:
As stated, the equilibrium represents a complicated fixed-point problem. There are potentially an infinite number of price schedules (one for each maturity), which depend on the government's fiscal policy going forward. The government's policies, in turn, depend on equilibrium price schedules. However, in the next section, we prove that the competitive equilibrium solves a modified planning problem, which allows a direct characterization of key properties of the equilibrium.
Discussion. Our modeling choices are guided by our focus on scenarios where the risk of default is a first-order concern for both consumption-saving decisions as well as the choice over debt maturity. Of course, in reality there may be many other considerations. During tranquil periods sovereigns issue a range of maturities to smooth tax distortions; to provide a source of safe assets for savers; to facilitate payments systems; and to insure against fluctuations in tax revenues, output or interest rates. However, in the midst of a sovereign debt crisis these considerations are to a large extent dominated by a sovereign's need to issue new debt to skeptical investors, to roll over or buy back outstanding debt, and perhaps to reduce the outstanding stock of debt in a credible (that is, time consistent) manner. Our model is intended to transparently isolates the role of maturity choice under the threat of default.
Before moving on, it is helpful to state a simple result about any Markov equilibrium: Lemma 1. Consider a Markov Competitive Equilibrium with value function V. Then, for any (l, t), the value function V(b, l, t) is non-increasing in b. In addition, for any
A Planning Problem
We now characterize competitive equilibria by considering a modified planning problem. We show although equilibria are not necessarily efficient in the usual Pareto sense, we can characterize them by solving a planning problem. To motivate the approach, consider the following contracting problem. A government enters period t with legacy liabilities (b, l). It then contracts with a new set of lenders, receiving a sequence of consumption {c t+k } k≥0 in exchange for a sequence of payments {y t+k − l k − c t+k } k≥0 conditional on not defaulting through t + k. As long as the government does not default it repays any legacy claims currently due. We consider contracts that maximize the joint surplus between the government and its new lenders. At it turn out, the allocations delivered by such contracts are equivalent to the outcome of competitive equilibria.
This contracting problem considers legacy lenders and new lenders as different agents, and legacy lenders' payoffs are not included in the joint surplus. 10 This is precisely why equilibria are not generally Pareto efficient, a point we discuss in detail in Section 7.
Efficient Contracts
Starting from any period t where the government has not defaulted and has long-term liabilities denoted by l t = l, consider the Pareto problem of allocating the country's resources from time t onwards between the government and a representative new lender, taking as given that (i) the government will default whenever it receives an outside option shock that is higher than its continuation payoff; (ii) if no default occurs in a given period, previously issued long-term claims must be paid; and (iii) in case of default, all lenders receive zero. In this particular planning problem, we also impose that the outside option shocks are not-observable, and as a result, the resulting consumption allocation cannot be made contingent on the realization of v D t , absent default. 11 An allocation is characterized by a consumption sequence {c t+k } k≥0 which determines the amount the government consumes at time t + k conditional on no default through t + k. This sequence implies a corresponding sequence of values, {V t+k } k≥0 , where V t+k denotes the expected value of the government conditional on not defaulting through time
Given {c t+k }, we can then define V t+k recursively:
for all k ≥ 0. The sequence {V t+k } k≥0 is the unique solution to this difference equation
Definition 2. An incentive-compatible allocation from time t onwards is a sequence of con-10 Of course, in equilibrium, the set of old lenders and new lenders may overlap; the idea of contracting with new versus old lenders is simply a useful device to characterize competitive equilibrium allocations. 11 Similarly, we restrict attention to deterministic allocations absent default (that is no randomization on the part of the Planner), as these represent the allocations that are feasible in equilibrium given our asset structure. 12 With a continuous distribution, the indifference point is measure zero, and can be ignored.
sumption and associated values to the government {c t+k , V t+k } ∞ k=0 , such that c t+k ≥ 0; and {V t+k } ∞ k=0 solves (6).
Conditional on legacy long-term liabilities inherited in period t, l, the resource constraint implies that the net payments (absent default) to the new lender n t+k associated with an allocation satisfies:
Thus the allocation {c t+k } k≥0 and l defines a stream of net payments to the new lender. Let B t denote the expected present value of these payments conditional on not defaulting in period t:
where the product in brackets represents the probability of not defaulting through period t + k conditional on not defaulting in period t.
As discussed above, we consider the notion of efficiency that weighs the welfare of new lenders and the government, but disregards the impact on payoffs to existing creditors. More formally:
Definition 3. An incentive-compatible allocation from time t onwards fixing long-term liabilities l ∈ L, {c t+k , V t+k } ∞ k=0 , is efficient at time t if there does not exist an alternative incentive-compatible allocation from time t onwards {ĉ t+k ,V t+k } ∞ k=0 such thatV t ≥ V t andB t ≥ B t with at least one of these inequalities strict, where B t andB t denote the respective solutions to equation (8).
Given equation (6), the value to a government that does not default at time t can never fall below u + β´v D dF t+1 (v D ), given the non-negativity of consumption and the option to the default in the future. Let us denote by 
subject to:
An efficient allocation, as in Definition 3, must solve this problem.
The following lemma will prove useful later on. It shows that we only need to consider incentive compatible allocations where equation (10) holds with equality; and, because of
. Then for the maximization in Problem 9, it suffices to consider only incentive compatible allocations such that
The next subsection establishes an associated First Welfare Theorem; namely, that competitive equilibrium allocations are efficient as in Definition 3. 14
A Welfare Theorem
In this section, we show that competitive equilibria are efficient in the sense of Definition 3. Towards this goal, consider a competitive equilibrium with an associated value function V and price functions q and Q. Given these, let us define the following function 13 We could consider allowing the planner to alter the payments to legacy lenders, subject to the constraint that any legacy lender could hold on to their existing claims (i..e, hold out). That is, letl denote the new sequence of payments to legacy bond holders. The constraint will then be
and the planner's flow objective at time t + k, in case of no default, would be (y t+k −l k − c t+k ). It is easy to see that the hold-out constraint above will hold with equality. Substituting this into the objective function delivers the same problem as in Problem 9. Note that if instead, the planner's problem is modified to deliver a given utility payoff to legacy lenders, rather then the hold-out constraint, the results will be different. In that case, studied in Section 7, there will be room for a Pareto improvement if the hold-out option is ruled out.
14 It is also the case that any efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibria. Given our interest in characterizing competitive equilibria, we omit discussion of this version of the Second Welfare Theorem.
B:
where the maximization problem represents the dual of problem 3. 15 Not surprisingly, B is the inverse of the equilibrium value function V:
Lemma 3. Consider a Markov Competitive Equilibrium with value function V and price func-
A first key result is that the efficient allocation in Problem 9 provides an upper bound on any equilibrium inverse value function B:
Lemma 4. Consider a Markov Competitive Equilibrium, and let B be as defined in equation (11). Then, for any (l, t) and
The proof of this result uses the no-arbitrage equilibrium restriction on prices to show that the constraint set of the dual problem 11 is a subset of the constraints for the planning problem 9. We now proceed to show that the upper bound of Lemma 4 is achieved in equilibrium. For this, we first show that we can use equation 11 to generate a lower bound on B by artificially restricting l = l ≥1 . Under this restriction, Q = 0, and from equation 11 we obtain that 16
Note that if the inequality in (12) were to always hold with equality, then the resulting functional equation would correspond to the Bellman equation that must be solved by B . Exploiting this idea, together with the boundedness result of Lemma 2, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Consider a Markov Competitive Equilibrium, and let B be as defined in equation (11). Then, for any (l, t), and
Lemma 5 shows that the presence of Q in equation (11) cannot reduce value as compared to an efficient outcome. The reason is that it is always possible to choose an allocation that replicates the efficient outcome, and sets Q = 0. Note that for this lower-bound result, we do not need to know the equilibrium shape of Q, except for the property that Q = 0 when no trades in long-term bonds occur. This is different from Lemma 4, were we exploited the equilibrium restrictions that arbitrage imposes on Q, and showed that the equilibrium value cannot do better than the efficient outcome. Putting these wtwo lemmas together implies that, for any Markov equilibria, B = B:
that is, a competitive equilibrium allocation is efficient.
Recall that in the discussion leading up to Lemma 5, we achieved the efficient payoff to new lenders in a competitive equilibrium by not trading long-term bonds. More generally, it is without loss to consider government policies that do not adjust long-term liabilities. We state that as a corollary to the proposition: 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 imply that an efficient allocation can be implemented in equilibrium using strategies that actively trade only one-period debt. This raises the question of whether there are equilibria that involve active trading in long-term bonds, and if not, what makes one-period bonds special. These questions are the subject of the next section.
The Cost of Trading Long-Term Debt
The previous section showed that an equilibrium allocation is efficient in the sense of Definition 3, and it is sufficient to consider policies such that the government trades only oneperiod claims. We now discuss why trading long-term bonds may generate strict losses to the government. We begin with an important property of the inverse value function B; namely, that it is convex in long-term liabilities. We use this to demonstrate that issuing or repurchasing long-term bonds is dominated by trading only short-term liabilities, and strictly so under certain conditions. The section concludes with a discussion of this key result.
Convexity
Recall that competitive equilibria deliver B (v, l, t) to holders of one-period bonds absent default, conditional on the government's value v and outstanding long-term debt l. An important property of the inverse value function B is that it is convex in l (and strictly so under some conditions), and its gradient is given by market prices:
given long-term liabilities l ∈ L. Then, for any other l ∈ L:
The inequality is strict if there exists j > 0 such that (i) p j−1 > 0; (ii) F t+j (V t+j ) ∈ (0, 1); and (iii) ∑ ∞ k=j p k l k − l k = 0.
The first part of the proposition follows from the fact that a consumption allocation that delivers v under l also delivers it under l . Moreover, the objective function in Prob-lem 9 is linear in consumption, and hence moving from l to l without changing the consumption allocation has a linear effect on value. It then follows that implementing the l-allocation is feasible for l and represents a linear change in the objective, but reoptimizing may be better.
The second part states conditions where re-optimizing, once the state variable has changed, leads to a strict improvement. Condition (i) says that period t + j is reached without default with positive probability; that is, the allocation in period t + j and beyond is relevant to payoffs. Condition (ii) says that default in period t + j conditional on reaching t + j is interior. This implies a small perturbation in the allocation starting from t + j will affect the default probability in period t + j. The final condition states that the two long-term liability sequences differ in period t + j or after. We hold off on the intuition behind this result until Subsection 5.3 below.
Implications for Cost of Long-Term Bonds
We are now ready to consider the cost of long-term trades. Consider an equilibrium and a situation where the government starts time t with state (b, l). We know by Proposition 1 that an optimal strategy for the government at this point would be to issue only one-period debt and remain passive in the long-term markets by setting l = l ≥1 . However, perhaps there is an equivalent-payoff strategy that involves trading long-term debt as well. To explore this, suppose that at time t the government pursues a debt policy of (b , l ), where l k = l k+1 for some k ≥ 1. The latter non-equality implies that the government actively issues or repurchases long-term debt.
The equilibrium payoff to the government from the (b , l ) strategy is:
where V t+1 = V(b , l , t + 1), and from the budget constraint we obtain 17
where p k are the equilibrium prices in period t + 1, consistent with state (b , l , t + 1), that is, p k = ρ k (B(b , l , t + 1), L(b , l , t + 1), t + 1) for k > 0, and p 0 = 1.
Consider now an alternative trade that only uses one-period bonds, but achieves the same continuation value. That is, suppose the government issuesb such that V(b , l ≥1 , t + 1) = V t+1 . Note that this implies one-period bond prices remain the same as under the (b , l ) strategy; importantly, long-term bond prices may change, but these have no budgetary impact as no long-term debt is issued or purchased in this alternative. The budget set implies that the associated consumption is:
and the government's utility is:
Comparing (14) to (13), the alternative strategy dominates ifĉ > c. Comparing the associated expressions for consumption, this is the case if:
Given the fact that B = B , and that any competitive equilibrium allocation is efficient, it follows that this expression is the same as that in Proposition 2, with the roles of l and l reversed. Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that this strict inequality holds if the conditions (i),(ii), and (iii) are satisfied. Hence, to achieve a given continuation value, the government has higher consumption if it remains passive in long-term debt markets: trading in the long-term bond markets can only shrink the government's budget set.
The "shrinking" of the budget set is due to the fact that active trades in long-term bonds have adverse impact on prices. We highlight this feature diagrammatically in Figure 1 . The diagram reflects the above scenario, in which the government enters period t with long-term liabilities l and pursues a strategy that yields a continuation value V t+1 . The diagram considers two dimensions of the possible debt policy. The diagram's vertical axis, labelled b , represents alternative choices for one-period bonds that will be due next period (t + 1), and the horizontal axis represents alternative choices for long-term bonds due in period t + 1 + k. Point A represents the inherited one-period debt and period t + 1 + k liabilities at the start of t: A = (b, l k+1 ). From this point, the government chooses a new portfolio (b , l k ) to take into period t + 1.
The bold convex line is the inverse value function, B, evaluated at period t + 1 states: b = B(V t+1 , l , t + 1). Specifically, holding constant V t+1 , the function depicts the value of one-period debt associated with alternative choices for liabilities due in period t + k + 1, Figure 1 : The convexity of the value function and the cost of long-term trades. l k . The function is downward sloping as more long-term debt requires less one-period debt to keep the value to the government constant at V t+1 . Its convexity is established in Proposition 2, and for the strict convexity that is depicted we assume that the conditions in that proposition hold for period t + 1 + k. From that proposition, the slope of the tangency line at each point of B reflects the t + 1 price of liabilities due in t + 1 + k, which is denoted p k . 18 this price is conditional on the choices (b , l k ), and thus varies as the government considers alternative policies.
The diagram considers a policy which, starting from point A, shifts the government's end-of-period portfolio to point A . The period-t consumption associated with this policy is:
Note that the term in square brackets is the equation of the line tangent to point A ; thus, as we follow this tangency to l k+1 , the height of this line (denote by m in the graph) maps into the level of consumption associated with the point-A policy. Now consider an alternative policy starting from point A that moves the portfolio to point A . The vertical height at point A , denoted byb , is strictly higher than m, a fact which follows directly from strict convexity. Correspondingly, the consumption associated with policy-A is greater than that of point A . As the continuation value is the same in both cases, this represents a strict improvement. That is, if the government were to choose A rather than A , it will lose resources.
Discussion
To obtain some intuition for the result, we first discuss the economics behind the convexity of B. Consider the contracting problem between new lenders and the government, given a sequence of long-term liabilities, l. The efficient allocation delivers a certain level of utility to the government through a mix of net payments and the values the government achieves through default. Now suppose that we increase the long-term liabilities that are due j periods ahead; l j < l j . This reduces the surplus in that period that can be split between new lenders and the government. In an efficient contract, there is an incentive to raise the probability of default in t + j at the margin, as less of the surplus is at stake at that time. Starting from an interior default probability at l, the efficient allocation will therefore lower p j in response to the increased l j . Note that the long-term debt holder is hurt by this, but the planning problem ignores this loss. Correspondingly, in a competitive equilibrium, there is no price mechanism that makes the government internalize this loss. Similarly, if l j > l j , the new lenders and the government now have a greater incentive to avoid default in period t + j, and the allocation will adjust accordingly.
This discussion highlights the core inefficiency in the environment. Small perturbations in the probability of default in any given period have a second-order loss for the government, as they are indifferent to default at the margin. However, they represent a first-order loss to existing bond holders. Thus efficiency requires that the government internalize these losses when choosing allocations in the competitive equilibrium. This is possible for one-period bondholders as prices move one-to-one with the probability of default, as is clear from the break-even condition (4). At the margin, the government bears the full cost or benefit of its consumption/savings decisions. This feature of one-period bonds is the reason that the competitive equilibrium is efficient from the perspective of one-period bondholders.
The equilibrium is not efficient from the perspective of long-term bondholders. When issued, the government pays actuarially fair prices, and thus long-term bondholders are compensated for expected default. However, in the future, the government does not face a price that makes it internalize the consequences of their actions on existing long-term bond holders. If the government could commit to a path of consumption at the time debt is issued, this would not represent a problem. However, the efficient consumption plan from the perspective of long-term bondholders is not generally time consistent, as there is no period-by-period price that aligns incentives. As a result, the default premium in short-term bond prices is akin to a variable cost that must paid each period and moves one-to-one with changes in default probability, aligning incentives. Long-term bonds also embed a default premium, at the time of issuance, but from the perspective of later periods, this premium is a sunk cost and provides no incentives going forward.
Another perspective on the sub-optimality of long-term debt arises from optimal contracting; namely, the problem with long-term debt is the lack of exclusivity. Recall that a competitive equilibrium allocation corresponds to an efficient contract between a set of new bondholders and the government, conditional on existing liabilities. The contract calls for a sequence of net payments to the lenders. With exclusivity, that sequence could be decentralized as a portfolio of bonds of arbitrary maturity, as the government cannot dilute the creditor by contracting with new bondholders. However, the competitive equilibrium does not admit the possibility of the government committing to future debt issuances. With short-term debt, the contract can be viewed as a sequence of one-period exclusive contracts with the representative lender. Given the assumption that there is only one auction per period, the one-period bond holder is never at risk of the government subsequently contracting with alternative creditors before repayment.
The lack of exclusivity of long-term bonds renders them inefficient. This raises the question of whether repurchasing the long-term bonds and replacing them with oneperiod bonds can undo this inefficiency and generate a higher value for the government. The above discussion says no. Any change in long-term debt raises the expected payments to bondholders. As the government replaces its long-term liabilities with shortterm bonds, its incentives to borrow or save change. Specifically, they change in a manner that raises the price of the repurchased liabilities. However, the new allocation was also feasible without repurchasing long-term bonds, but not optimal. The government does not need to alter its portfolio of long-term debt to contemplate alternative sequences of consumption, holding constant expected net payments. Thus repurchasing debt represents an unnecessary transfer to bondholders that could have been avoided by restricting activity exclusively to one-period bond markets.
The sub-optimality of repurchasing long-term bonds on secondary markets is reminiscent of Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991) . Their analysis turns on a finite amount of resources available to pay bond holders in default. In such a situation, a bond buyback concentrates the remaining bondholders' claim on this payout, and so drives up the price of bonds. Indeed, in this environment the sovereign would like to dilute existing bond holders by selling additional claims to this fixed recovery amount. The money raised would come in part at the expense of the previous bond holders, thus subsidizing the bond issue. The Bulow-Rogoff environment contains no incentive for the sovereign to pay down its debt, whether via a buy back or not reissuing short-term debt, and its three-period structure offers little scope for debt dynamics. In our environment, there is no liquidation value to debt which can be diluted; rather, the behavior of bond prices is due solely to the incentive effects of maturity choice.
The fact that a repurchase leads to a capital gain for bondholders should not lead one to view the environment as zero sum; that is, a capital gain for bondholders is not necessarily a loss for the government, and vice versa for a capital loss. Our example in Figure 1 of issuing long-term bonds represented a loss for existing bondholders but was nevertheless suboptimal. In our environment, default is not a zero sum game, as the government is indifferent at the margin with strictly positive debt, and thus does not capture what bondholders lose. 19 The capital gains and losses referenced in Figure 1 represent the fact that the government's optimal fiscal policy changes with its portfolio of debt. However, these alternative policies are also feasible by trading only short-term debt, but not chosen. 20 As we shall discuss in Section 7, there is a change in portfolio that makes both the long-term bondholders and the government better off, but this cannot be implemented through competitive trades.
A Stationary Economy with a Perpetuity and a One-Period Bond
To better understand the forces at play in the model, in this section we proceed to characterize the equilibrium in a stationary environment with a simple asset structure. Specifically, we assume the endowment is constant (y t = y), the distribution of outside option shocks is independent of time (F t = F), and the market structure is restricted to a oneperiod bond and a perpetuity. A one-period bond is, as before, a promise to deliver 1 in the subsequent period and zero thereafter. A perpetuity is a promise to deliver a constant flow of payments of 1 forever. We denote by b the stock of one-period bonds at the beginning of the period, and by l the corresponding stock of perpetuities. Besides previously issued perpetuity claims, there are no other legacy claims.
Let us first focus on the efficient allocation, given an amount of legacy claims, and later on, relate this to the competitive equilibrium using Proposition 1. In this case, the efficient allocation solves:
subject to :
Although the value function is not necessarily everywhere differentiable, we can show the following marginal characterization: (v, l) , the optimal policy, v , is such that v > v D , then
. Then the following holds:
Note that equation (15) is the usual Euler equation when debt is risk-free. That is, when the promised value v is sufficiently large and, as a result, the probability of default is zero, the government behaves (locally) like a standard consumer facing a constant interest rate. If βR = 1, consumption would be constant. If βR < 1, consumption would be decreasing with time reflecting relative impatience.
Note however that when the promised value v is within the support of the outside option shocks, then the probability of default is strictly positive. In this case, the Euler equation has a new term given by the right-hand side of equation (16). Suppose for example that βR = 1 and that B (v , l) > 0. Then, in this case, c > c; that is, consumption is back-loaded. Intuitively, at the margin, it is optimal to increase future continuation values by postponing consumption in order to reduce the default probability tomorrow by the marginal density f (v ). In equilibrium, the government internalizes this change because f (v )/F(v ) governs the elasticity of the equilibrium one-period bond price schedule with respect to debt issuances. As long as default has positive probability and there are oneperiod bonds outstanding, the government has an incentive to save at the margin. Given βR = 1, this is the only incentive to tilt consumption, and starting from a situation where the government has strictly positive one-period debt, the Euler equations imply that the government will save until either (i) the level of one-period debt is zero, or (ii) default risk completely disappears. Figure 2 depicts the outcome of a numerical simulation of the model. The downward solid sloping lines are combinations of (l, b) such that v is constant along each line; that is, b = B (v, l) for respective values of v. In the Southeast corner of the diagram, debt is low enough (or v is high enough) that default is never optimal. As we move Northeast, v declines and the default probability increases. The figure also plots two possible equilibrium paths depicted by the circles connected by the arrows. The two equilibrium paths are distinguished by the initial debt portfolio. In the example on the left, there is a relatively low level of long-term debt and the allocation converges to the no-default region with strictly positive levels of one-period debt. Once it reaches the no-default region, (15) implies that consumption is stationary thereafter. In the right example, the government pays down its one-period debt but never removes the risk of default posed by long-term debt. Equation (16) implies that consumption is stationary despite the risk of default, as there is no debt being rolled over. However, in this case the government eventually de-faults once a high-enough outside option is realized. The fact that the equilibrium paths are vertical lines in this state space reflects the result that the government only actively trades one-period bonds (and the perpetuity never matures).
The equilibrium paths depicted in Figure 2 capture the incentive to save provided by one-period bonds. Recall that bond prices are actuarially fair and are priced at the government's discount rate when βR = 1. Nevertheless, the government faces inter-temporal prices that induce saving. In particular, equilibrium prices require that the sovereign compensate lenders for the expected creditor losses in default. However, the government does not receive the corresponding equivalent benefit from default. To see this, suppose that the outside option realization is marginally above the government's value of repayment. In this case, the government is nearly indifferent between default and repayment, but the creditors suffer a discrete loss. Ex ante, bond prices are such that the government must compensate creditors for the possibility of the full loss. This provides the government an incentive to raise the price of its bonds at the margin by paying down one-period debt, as indicated by the Euler equation (15). This incentive is operational as long as oneperiod debt is outstanding or default is a non-zero probability. The perpetuity provides no such incentive, as the benefits of reducing the default probability after issuance are not captured by the government.
When βR < 1, the incentive to pay down one-period bonds is tempered by relative impatience. From equation (15), the interior of the no-default region is never a stationary point, as there is no countervailing cost to front loading consumption at the margin. Similarly, from equation (16), zero one-period debt is never a stationary point. However, in regions of the state space with f (v)b > 0, the elasticity of the bond price schedule provides an incentive for patience that can support a stationary point. This point may be on the boundary of the no-default region or in the region of the state space with strictly positive probability of default, but always with strictly positive one-period debt. Figure 3 is the counterpart of Figure 2 for the case of βR < 1. The solid and dotted lines again represent (b, l) loci with constant v. The dashed line represents stationary points of the equilibrium. The left example equilibrium (again depicted by circles connected by the arrows) is similar to that of Figure 2 . In particular, the government pays down one-period debt until it reaches the no-default region. Once on the boundary, its impatience is exactly offset by the marginal price decline induced by borrowing into the possible-default region. Differently form Figure 2 , in which the entire no-default region contained stationary points, if the initial state had been directly below the no-default region boundary, the government would have borrowed up to the boundary of the region by exclusively issuing one-period bonds. The right-hand path depicts the case with larger initial long-term debt. In this case, the stationary point is in the interior of the region in which default occurs with positive probability. Again, if the initial state had been below the dashed line, the government would borrow to this point by issuing one-period bonds. This is the case shown in the middle path. One other difference between the two figures is that in Figure 3 , the convexity of the value function applies to the portions of the dotted lines inside the no-default region. This reflects that if the initial l is large enough, the government will eventually borrow into the interior of the default region. Correspondingly, trades of long-term assets, even though there is currently no risk of default, entail strict losses to the government given that future equilibrium default occurs with positive probability.
The case when βR < 1 Figure 3 : The solid lines are combinations of (l, b) such that b = B (v, l) for several values of v. The shaded area is the "no-default" area where v > v D , and the ex-ante probability of default is zero. The dashed line represents steady-state points. The figure also plots three possible equilibrium paths (the circles) where the allocation converges to either (i) the boundary of the no-default region, or (ii) the interior of the default region. The parameters used were u = log, y = 2, R = 1.05, β = .9/R, and the outside option equals u(τy)/(1 − β) where τ is uniform in [0.2, 0.9].
The Yield Curve
The equilibrium trajectories discussed above shed light on the relevance (or irrelevance) of the slope of the yield curve in determining the optimal maturity of debt issuance. Let r k denote the implied yield of a zero-coupon bond that matures in k periods. In particular, the one-period implied yield is r 1 = q −1 − 1, where q is the equilibrium price of the one-period bond. Similarly, r k = ρ − 1 k k − 1 for zero-coupon bonds maturing in k periods that trade at price ρ k . 21 As a result, r k is therefore the geometric mean of the conditional hazard of default from t + 1 through t + k. Thus r k+1 ≷ r k depending on whether the t + k + 1 conditional default probability, F t+k+1 (V t+k+1 ), is greater or less than the average of the periods preceding it. In Figure 3 , if the government starts below the dashed line depicting stationary points, it faces an upward sloping yield curve, as creditors anticipate the higher future debt levels and associated default probabilities. On the other hand, if it starts above the dashed line, the yield curve will slope down. These two situations are plotted in Figure 4 . However, in both scenarios, the government can achieve its equilibrium value without trading long-term debt. Moreover, if the strict convexity conditions of Proposition 2 are satisfied, trading long-term bonds generates strict losses independently of whether the yield curve slopes up or down. The irrelevance of the yield curve highlights that what is important for the result is not the relative level of the interest rate at different maturities (as implied by the yield curve or the associated prices), but instead the elasticity of bond prices to maturity choice.
The yield curve for βR < 1 Figure 3 . The solid line is the yield curve starting from a point above the steady-state line. The dashed line is the yield curve starting from a point below the steady-state line. In both cases l = 0.25 and b starts at 0.23 for the solid line and at 1.33 for the dashed line. 21 That is, ρ k = ρ k (B(b, l, t), L(b, l, t), t), where (b, l, t) is the current state.
Pareto Efficient Restructuring
Section 3 introduced a planning problem to analyze competitive equilibria. The notion of efficiency in Definition 3 ignored potential gain or losses to legacy bond holders when comparing different allocations. In this section, we broaden this to a general notion of efficiency, which would include the expected payoff to long-term bondholders as well. Specifically, consider making the sequence of payments l k a choice variable rather than a state in the contracting problem (9) (i.e., we are restructuring the legacy claims). In addition, let us add an additional constraint to that problem that guarantees long-term bondholders a minimal expected payoff w:
This new problem then traces out the maximum payoff to new bondholders conditional on the welfare of the government and long-term bondholders, and thus as we vary v and w we trace out the Pareto frontier.
Note that constraint (17) will bind in the solution to this expanded problem (otherwise the payment to new-bond holders could be increased). Using this constraint to substitute out l k from the objective, we have a problem that simply subtracts w from the net payments. The problem then is isomorphic to the one considered in Section 3, but with an additional expected payment of w to creditors. From the results of that section, the Pareto efficient allocation can then be decentralized by allocating short-term bonds with value w to existing long-term bondholders. As long as the payment w is weakly higher than the market value of their legacy claims in the original competitive equilibrium outcome, long-term bond holders will find this restructuring beneficial.
While such a swap is a Pareto improvement, it cannot be done via market trades. The analysis of Section 5 demonstrated that it is never optimal for the government to issue short-term bonds in order to repurchase long-term bonds. The issue here is that such trades give too much of the surplus to legacy lenders for the government to be indifferent. Therefore, such restructurings, if are to be undertaken, must be implemented via non-market arrangements (such as bargaining between all creditors, as a group, and the government).
We explore visually this result in Figure 5 repayment in the current period. As in Figure 1 , a tangency line to the function B presents the price of the long-term claim; in this case, the price assumes equilibrium behavior starting from initial state A, which is our benchmark for restructuring. The vertical intercept of the tangency line denoted m represents the current period market value of all the debt at the initial point A; that is, m = b + p k l k . Similarly, the intercept of the value function B and the vertical axis, labelled m , represents the amount of one-period bonds that would make the government indifferent between point A and a portfolio composed solely of one-period bonds. Convexity of B implies that m is weakly greater than m, and strictly so if the conditions for strict convexity are satisfied (which we assume in the diagram). That is, the government is indifferent to a restructuring that swaps all legacy claims l k in exchange for an amount m − b of additional one-period bonds. With strict convexity, because m > m the swap represents a strict improvement for bond-holders, as the market value of outstanding debt increases. More generally, a restructuring to any point on the vertical axis between m and m represents a Pareto improvement, as these points represent combinations of increases in the market value of debt and increases in the government's value. However, these Pareto-efficient restructurings cannot be implemented through competitive markets. In particular, the convexity of B implies that market prices of long-term bonds will be higher for portfolios on the vertical axis than at the initial point A. If the government were to propose such a swap to bondholders, legacy bondholders will want to hold-out and reap the resulting capital gains from the restructuring. There-fore, such restructurings require some form of collective bargaining and cannot be done through arms-lengths transactions.
The analysis of this section implies that an efficient restructuring reduces the maturity of the government debt portfolio. From this perspective, the lengthening of maturities that accompany actual debt restructurings in practice appears puzzling. However, the conflict between the model and actual practice is less severe than it appears. In the model, one-period debt provides the correct incentives for the government to minimize the net loss from default. In particular, a portfolio composed exclusively of one-period bonds implements the fiscal trajectory that a Pareto planner would choose. Maturity extensions in practice are often motived by providing "breathing room" to the sovereign by mitigating rollover risk, something we abstract from in the present paper. However, our framework suggests such extensions provide perverse incentives for fiscal policy going forward. To address this, many restructurings involving official agencies such as the IMF or EU therefore impose conditionality on the debtor. While private markets lack the ability to impose conditionality, it is also questionable how enforceable official conditionality is in practice, particularly as the IMF and other supra-national lenders may lack the political will to punish the debtor ex post. This issue does not arise in the competitive equilibrium we consider. In particular, bond holders only demand to break even on average, which is always a time consistent disciplining device.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that actively engaging in the long-term bond market during periods of potential default entails costs for a sovereign. In particular, shifts in the maturity structure imply changes in the equilibrium relative prices of long-term bonds. Such changes are always moving against the borrower; that is, the relative price of longterm bonds rises when the sovereign buys them, while it falls when the sovereign issues more. Quite generally, these actions will tend to shrink the budget set of the government, generating an incentive to use only short-term bonds.
We showed that the competitive equilibrium solved a planning problem, and that the decentralization involves trading one-period bonds exclusively. Interestingly, even though short-term debt is efficient, the sovereign makes no attempt to repurchase existing long-term bonds and replace them with one-period debt. Such a swap will be costly. This holds regardless of whether the equilibrium yield curve slopes up or down. The relevant price is the cost of bonds at the margin, and not the prices of existing bonds on secondary markets.
A Appendix: Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let us first show a couple of lemmas, that hold for any given equilibrium.
Note that from (BC), it follows that for any choice, (c 0 , b , l ) we have that
From the definition of m and > 0, there exists a c 0 , b , l that satisfy these inequalities, which guarantees that V(b, l, t) > u + βV = V. In addition, picking the highest possible c 0 and the highest possible continuation value delivers an upper-bound:
, as consuming c = y t − l 0 − b > 0 and defaulting in the next period is a feasible strategy. As a result, it follows that
Using this, we have that for any k ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1.v. Thus,
We then have that for all k ≥ 0, given state variable b t+k , l ≥k , setting consumption equal toc and debt b = b t+k+1 is feasible. It follows then that
Proof of Lemma 1. The fact that V is non-increasing in b follows directly from the fact that a reduction in b only relaxes the budget constraint, and thus the value function must weakly increase.
For the second part, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose then that there exists a
By Lemmas 6 and 8, we can find b 0 and b 1 such that
implies that there exists a b 2 ∈ (b 0 , b 1 ) and a δ > 0, such that
That is, V must feature a discontinuity at b 2 . Take now the equilibrium consumption policy at b 2 − , and let us denote it by c( ). From Assumption 1.iv, it follows that u(c( )) > u min , as V(b 2 − , l, t) > v ≥ v D t . Note that for sufficiently small , the consumption policy c( ) − 2 with the same b is feasible at b 2 + , as c( ) is bounded away from 0 for all . It follows then that
For sufficiently small, we have that
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let H s be defined as follows:
. An allocation is incentive compatible allocation if and only if H s (c t+s , V t+s , V t+s+1 ) = 0 for all s ≥ 0, that is, equation (6) is satisfied.
Let us first argue that we can restrict attention to allocations with V t = v 0 . Consider an incentive compatible allocation {c t+s ,
where the fist inequality follows from v 0 ≥ v D t and G s+1 (V ) ≤ V; and the second inequality by Assumption 1.iv. Continuity of H 0 guarantees that there is a value ofc t such that 0 <c t < c t and H(c t , v 0 , V t+1 ) = 0. We can then construct another feasible allocation, {c t+k ,Ṽ t+k } withc t+k = c t+k andṼ t+k = V t+k for all k ≥ 1, andc t < c t andṼ t = v 0 . This alternative allocation delivers a strictly higher value than the original (as the continuation allocation is the same, but initial consumption is strictly lower). As a result, it is without loss to consider only allocations with V t = v 0 .
Let us now argue that we can restrict attention to allocations where V t+s is bounded. 
Continuity of H s with respect to c guarantees that there must ac t+s ∈ [c t+s , ∞) such that (18) holds. The third case is whenṼ t+s = w < V t+s and V t+s+1 =Ṽ t+s+1 ≤ w. For this case, H s (c t+s , w, V t+s+1 ) ≥ H s (c t+s , V t+s , V t+s+1 ) = 0. We also know that
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1.iv. Again, continuity of H s with respect to c guarantees that there must ac t+s ∈ (0, c t+s ] such that (18) holds. The final case is whenṼ t+s = w < V t+s andṼ t+s+1 = w < V t+s+1 . In this case,c t+s must solve u(c t+s ) = (1 − β)w, which must exists given that w ∈ [V, V).
We argue now that the new allocation {c t+s ,Ṽ t+s } is an improvement over the original. Towards this, first note that F t+s (V t+s ) = F t+s (Ṽ t+s ) for all s ≥ 0. The value generated from this new allocation, in comparison with the original, can be written as:
where C denotes the inverse function of u; p s ≡ R −s ∏ s i=1 F t+i (V t+i ); K ≡ {s|s ∈ K or s + 1 ∈ K}; and where the second equality uses (6), and the last uses that consumption is only potentially different across allocations for s ∈ K . It follows that
where the first inequality uses the convexity of C; and the equality, uses that G s (w) = w, that for all s ∈ K, p s = R −1 p s−1 , and rearranges terms. We also know that w − βG s+1 (Ṽ t+s+1 ) ≥Ṽ t+s−1 − βw which follows fromṼ t+s−1 ≤ w, and G s+1 (Ṽ t+s+1 ) ≤ G s+1 (w) = w (given that G s is increasing). By concavity of C, we have 0 ≤ C (Ṽ t+s−1 − βw) ≤ C (w − βG s+1 (Ṽ t+s+1 )) for all s ∈ K. Given that βR < 1, the above implies that (βR) C Ṽ t+s−1 − βw − C w − βG s+1 (Ṽ t+s+1 ) ≤ 0; for all s ∈ K Together with V t+s ≥ w for all s ∈ K, it follows from (19) that B t ({Ṽ t+s }) −B t ({V t+s }) ≥ 0 Thus, the allocation {Ṽ t+s } generates a weak improvement over the original. As a result, we can restrict attention to allocations such that V t+s ≤ max{V t , V D }.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Let v = V(b, l, t). Given that V(b, l, t) ≥ v D t , the constraint set in problem 3 is non-empty. Consider then the equilibrium policies, b = B(b, l, t) ≤ B and l = L(b, l, t) ∈ Γ(l, t) together with v = V(b , l , t + 1), and let c be the associated equilibrium consumption. The equilibrium budget constraint must hold, so y t − l 0 − c + q(b , l , t)b + Q(l, l , b , t) ≥ b. Given that the policy {c, b , l , v } is feasible in problem 11, we have obtained a lower bound to the value: B(v, l, t) ≥ b. In addition, if B(v, l, t) > b, then there must exist a feasible vector of policies (c,b ,l ,ṽ ) such that v = u(c) + β´max{V(b ,l , t + 1), v D }dF t+1 (v D ) and b < y t − l 0 −c + q(b ,l , t)b + Q(l,l ,b , t). But this implies that we can find an alternative policy (ĉ,b ,l ) withĉ >c that satisfies the equilibrium budget constraint at (b, l) and delivers an equilibrium value higher than v = V(b, l, t), a contradiction of optimality in equilibrium. It follows then that B(v, l, t) = b.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Let {c t+k } ∞ k=0 denote an equilibrium consumption sequence with associated equilibrium choices {b k , l k } ∞ k=1 , starting from initial state b 0 = b and l 0 = l. Given this equilibrium, let us define p t k as the equilibrium discounted survival probability k additional periods, starting from time t. The equilibrium budget constraint requires that
In period t + 1, the equilibrium budget constraint implies
We can keep substituting and we get to the following:
But recall that b N ≤B; and l N k ≤l whereB > 0 andl > 0. Using that p t+N k−N ≤ R −k+N , we get that
Taking limits as N → ∞, we have that that last term goes to zero, and the equilibrium allocation must satisfy that
The efficient problem 9 maximizes ∑ ∞ k=0 p t k (y t+k − l k − c t+k ) subject to delivering v = V(b, l, t) to the government. It follows then that b = B(v, l, t) ≤ ∑ ∞ k=0 p t k (y t+k − l k − c t+k ) ≤ B (v, l, t).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Consider an incentive compatible allocation {c t+k , V t+k } k≥0 for the planning problem 9 at time t, given v ∈ [v D t , V) and (l, t), and let us suppose that this allocation satisfies the condition in Lemma 2. Note that choosing c t and promising v = V t+1 is feasible in Problem 12, and we have that:
Repeating the above argument sequentially for subsequent dates, it follows that
Given that we are only considering allocations where V t+k ≤ max{v, V D }, we have that
where c is such that u(c) = (1 − β)w and w ≡ max{v, V D , u max /(1 − β)}. The first inequality follows from monotonicity of B and that V t+n ≤ w, and the second follows because V(b 0 , l ≥n , t + n) ≥ u(c)/(1 − β) = w, using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 8. So we have that
where the first inequality follows from the No-Ponzi condition, and the last one from the fact that l n+k ≤ l, and y t+n+k ≥ 0. Given that both sides of equation (20) are finite, it follows that the lim n→∞ ∏ n i=1 R −1 F t+i (V t+i ) B(V t+n , l ≥n , t + n) = 0, and
for any incentive compatible allocation {c t+k , V t+k } k≥0 that satisfies the condition in Lemma 2. But given that, to compute the efficient value function, those allocations are sufficient, we have that B(v, l, t) ≥ B (v, l, t).
Optimality of the original allocation implies that the above must be zero. Using the previous equation, we have that
Note that in the case v t+1 > v D , we have that dF(v t+1 )/dc t+1 = 0, and (15) follows. For the case where v t+1 ∈ (v D , v D ), we have that dF(v t+1 )/dc t+1 = f (v t+1 )u (c t+1 ), and (16) follows.
